Were the 1) the inoperative alternate anti-skid control valve due to the disconnected electrical connector on the parking brake shut-off valve, the area was inspected 2 days earlier 2) the total loss of the hydraulic system resulting in the inability of the flight crew to maintain directional control. Factors in the accident were the 1) inadequate lightning protection design of the airplane by the manufacturer between the horizontal and vertical stabilizers which resulted in arching damage to hydraulic lines and depletion of the hydraulic fluid from the Nos. 1 and 2 hydraulic systems 2) inadequate weather information disseminated to the flight crew during the preflight briefing by the company dispatcher for failing to provide current up-to-date information of the intensity, and location of adverse weather 3) the failure of the company dispatcher to relay pertinent weather information to the flight crew while en route which included convective sigmets, and the current extent and intensity of the squall line 4) the operation of the airplane by the flight crew within 10 miles from the northern edge of a ground based weather radar depicted level 5 thunderstorm resulting in a lightning strike 5) insufficient standards/requirements, operation/operator by the company management to require weather radar training in recurrent, upgrade, and requalification training, and 6) the limitations of the weather products provided to the flight crew by the airline for failure to include convective sigmets for the central U.S., based on the geographic location of the destination airport being east of the eastern/central boundary.

THE IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF THE SPACERS BY THE MECHANIC AND THE UNCLEAR INFORMATION SUPPLIED FROM THE MANUFACTURER AND OPERATOR REGARDING THE INSTALLATION OF THE SPACERS.