(1) THE LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL BY THE PILOT IN COMMAND DURING THE TAKEOFF ROLL, AND HIS DECISION TO CONTINUE THE TAKEOFF AND INITIATE A ROTATION BELOW THE COMPUTED ROTATION AIRSPEED, RESULTING IN A PREMATURE LIFTOFF, FURTHER LOSS OF CONTROL AND COLLISION WITH THE TERRAIN. (2) THE FLIGHTCREW'S LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE THREE-ENGINE TAKEOFF PROCEDURES, AND THEIR DECISION TO MODIFY THOSE PROCEDURES. (3) THE FAILURE OF THE COMPANY TO ENSURE THAT THE FLIGHTCREW HAD ADEQUATE EXPERIENCE, TRAINING, AND REST TO CONDUCT THE NONROUTINE FLIGHT. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE INADEQUACY OF FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OVERSIGHT OF AIR TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL AND FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION FLIGHT AND DUTY TIME REGULATIONS THAT PERMITTED A SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED FLIGHTCREW REST PERIOD WHEN CONDUCTING A NONREVENUE FERRY FLIGHT UNDER 14 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS PART 91. (NTSB REPORT AAR-95/06)