(1) THE CAPTAIN AND FIRST OFFICER'S INADEQUATE COCKPIT DISCIPLINE WHICH RESULTED IN THE FLIGHTCREW'S ATTEMPT TO TAKEOFF WITHOUT THE WING FLAPS AND SLATS PROPERLY CONFIGURED; AND (2) THE FAILURE OF THE TAKEOFF CONFIGURATION WARNING SYSTEM TO ALERT THE CREW THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS NOT PROPERLY CONFIGURED FOR THE TAKEOFF. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS DELTA'S SLOW IMPLEMENTATION OF NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS TO ITS OPERATING PROCEDURES, MANUAL'S, CHECKLISTS, TRAINING, AND CREW CHECKING PROGRAMS WHICH WERE NECESSITATED BY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE AIRLINE FOLLOWING RAPID GROWTH AND MERGER. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE LACK OF SUFFICIENTLY AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY THE FAA TO HAVE KNOWN DEFICIENCIES CORRECTED BY DELTA AND THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN THE FAA'S AIR CARRIER INSPECTION PROCESS.